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Modern nation-states have been trapped in recurring cycles
of incarcerating and emancipating residents with psychiatric disabilities. New cycles of enthusiasm for incarceration
generally commence with well-defined claims about the evils
of allowing “the mad” to remain at liberty and the benefits
incarceration would bring to the afflicted. A generation or
two later, at most, reports of terrible conditions in institutions circulate and new laws follow, setting high burdens for
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those seeking to imprison and demanding exacting legal procedures with an emphasis on individual civil liberties. Today, we seem to be arriving at another turn in the familiar
cycle. A growing movement led by professionals and family
members of people with mental health disabilities is calling
for new laws enabling earlier and more assertive treatment.
After reviewing the history of civil commitment law, this essay suggests that the time is ripe in the United States to end
this recurring cycle and make conservation of human dignity
the core legal authority behind the state’s power of civil
commitment and the major normative guide for both legal
procedure and treatment. We conclude that the dignity approach has the potential to move the debate beyond the current face-off between consumer and peer advocates, who
wish to avoid any revision of the civil commitment reforms
enacted forty years ago, and families and professionals, who
favor significant changes.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the “Great Confinement” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,1 modern nation-states have been trapped in recurring cycles of incarcerating and emancipating residents with symptomatic psychiatric disabilities. New cycles of enthusiasm for incarceration generally commence with well-defined claims about the
evils of allowing the mad to remain at liberty and the benefits incarceration would bring to those afflicted. A generation or two later, at
most, reports of terrible conditions in institutions circulate and new
laws follow, setting high burdens for those seeking to incarcerate the
mad and demanding exacting legal procedures. The cycle begins
again as a new group of reformers argue that people with psychiatric
disabilities have been abandoned to even worse forms of incarceration than the asylums from which they were emancipated.
We use the admittedly archaic terms “mad” and “madness”—
along with the more acceptable “people with mental illness” or “persons with psychiatric disabilities”—as a way of shaking up the categories that have shaped our most recent cycles.2 It is important to
1

MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS 44 (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan
Murphy & Jean Khalfa trans., Routledge 2006) (1961).
2
The line dividing acceptable terminology from unacceptable can be blurry.
No matter what term we employ, there is virtual disagreement amongst consumers, advocates and other professionals. See e.g., Charles O’Mahony, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Abolition
of the Insanity Defense 6 (unpublished paper) (on file with authors) (citing “mad”
and “crazy” as politically incorrect terms which nonetheless reclaim the stigma).
On the linguistic politics, see, e.g, Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Hammerin’ Hank: The
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bear in mind that we use those terms not to describe people, or illnesses of the mind, but those social situations in which people with
mental illness find themselves caught up in homelessness, drug
abuse or crime victimization. Or else, they become a subject of police concern or (in the eyes of their families or neighbors) are at risk
of becoming the subject of police concern, and they end up incarcerated.3
After reviewing the history of civil commitment law, this essay
takes up the foundations for the dignity approach and its core principles. We conclude that the dignity approach has the potential to
move the debate beyond the current face-off between consumer advocates who wish to avoid any revision of the civil commitment reforms enacted forty years ago and families who favor significant
changes.
I. HISTORY OF ASYLUMS
Prior to the sixteenth century, the mad, along with other categories of the nomadic poor, were tolerated in varying degrees or they
were abandoned and ignored—at least within European societies.4
They were perceived as curiosities, objects of charity and signs of
divine or satanic powers—a focus for family and religious control,
rather than the state (Figures 1 and 2). By the middle of the seventeenth century, the presence of the mad in public was taken to be a
direct threat to public health. Institutions to confine them, along with

Right to be Raunchy or FM Freak Show?, 23 Disability Studies Qtrly, nn. 51–57
(2003), http://www.brandeis.edu/lemberg/SGHL/DSQ.html (discussing the reclaiming of outmoded identity terms and epithets). But see Richard Fung, Looking
for My Penis: The Eroticized Asian in Gay Porn, in How Do I Look? Queer Film
and Video 168, n.8 (1991) (Bad-Object Choices, eds.) (“too much time spent on
the politics of ‘naming’ can in the end be diversionary”).
3
See Pfeiffer, infra note 33. By using “subject of police concern,” we deliberately avoid the invocation of a particular standard for dangerousness or other
justification for officer intervention.
4
FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 48, 53 (describing the terms of the establishment by royal decree in 1656 Paris’s Hôpital General consolidating the city’s
existing institutions for confinement and relief under the King’s authority and
with substantial investment from the Crown).
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other disconnected and troubled individuals, were viewed as requisite to the sovereignty of emerging nation-states.5 Within a century
and a half, reformers throughout Europe, such as John Howard in
England and Philippe Pinel in France, would decry this carceral archipelago, especially the cruelty of confining the mad without treatment (Figures 4 and 5).6

Fig. 1 Heronymous Bosch, “Ship of Fools” (1490).

5
In 1575, for example, Elizabeth I’s Parliament enacted a law ordering the
construction of poor houses for “the punishment of vagabonds and the relief of
the poor” beginning the spread of all sorts of small jails and houses of corrections
in England and Wales. See JOHN PORTER, HISTORY OF THE FYLDE OF LANCASHIRE
476 (1876).
6
The asylum movement of the nineteenth and twentieth century was informed by a more scientific categorization of madness and carefully distinguished
between the mad, criminals, and the indigent, assigning them to distinct institutions (hospital, prison, and workhouse), but the scale of confinement actually
grew. See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:
SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1st ed. 1971).

6
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Fig. 2 Hieronymous Bosch, “The Cure of Folly: Extraction of
the Stone of Madness” (1475-1480).

Fig. 3 Pieter Breughel, “Mad Meg” (1563).
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Fig. 4 Francisco Goya, “Yard with Mad Men” (1794)

Fig. 5 Tony Robert-Fleury, “Pinel Liberating the Madwomen
of the Salpetrière” (1795)
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Today, we seem to be arriving at another turn in the familiar cycle. In the United States, where the first asylums for people with
psychiatric disabilities were built in the early ninteenth century and
revitalized in the early twentieth century,7 we now seem poised to
begin our third cycle. A growing movement led by professionals and
family members of people with psychiatric disabilities is calling for
new laws enabling earlier and more assertive treatment. The new
reformers are pointing to unprecedented numbers of mentally ill
people in jails and prisons, citing alarming reports of armed assaults
by people with known psychiatric disabilities that have gone untreated—like Jared Loughner, who shot Representative Gabriel
Gifford in Arizona in 2010—and citing the benefits of a newer generation of psychiatric treatment drugs.8 In this essay, we suggest that
the time is ripe in the United States to end this recurring cycle of
incarceration and emancipation. It is time to make conservation of
human dignity the core legal authority behind the state’s power of
civil commitment and the major normative guide for both legal procedure and treatment.
Historically, incarceration of people with psychiatric disabilities
has been based on one or two historic powers of the modern state,
inherited from its monarchical ancestors. One is parens patriae, the
state’s power to protect citizens and residents against death or injury
when they have become disabled and are unable to care for themselves and their affairs.9 The second is the state’s power to protect
7

See Patricia D’Antonio, History of Psychiatric Hospitals, http://www.nursing.upenn.edu/nhhc/Pages/HistoryofPsychiatricHospitals.aspx (last visited Aug.
19, 2015).
8
For example, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), an advocacy organization for families of people with mental illness that supports significant reform of civil commitment laws, states the following in the opening lines of
one of its online publications: “Since 1990, remarkably effective medications
have become available for the treatment of mental illnesses. The introduction of
these medications represents an unprecedented turning point for the more than
five million Americans who have severe mental illnesses and for their families.”
Access to Effective Medications: A Critical Link to Mental Illness Recovery,
NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www2.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/E-News/20003/July_20002/Access_to_Effective_Medications__A_Critical_Link_to_Mental_Illness_Recovery1.htm (last visited June 15, 2015).
9
Parens patriae invokes the historical concept that the sovereign is literally
“a father” to the people of the land. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 42 (2005); see Jonathan Simon, Power
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its citizens or residents against violent assaults from others, typically
called the state’s “police power.”10 Modern civil commitment law is
based on both powers. After the last pro-emancipation reform turn
of the cycle in the 1970s, most states established parallel standards
that protect persons against incarceration based on symptoms of
psychiatric disability alone. In addition to evidence of that disability,
the state must show they are too disabled to care for themselves or
are a danger to themselves or others.11 The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that protecting human dignity is an independent basis for state power that informs and goes beyond the exercise
of parens patriae or police powers. A careful reading of past precedents12 and the Court’s most recent decision on the rights of people
with serious mental illness13 suggest that revised mental health
codes do pass constitutional muster. These decisions embrace the
principles of a “dignity-based” approach to civil commitment.
Dignity as a legal value has long animated movements to reform
treatment of people with psychiatric disabilities and was at the core
of the last wave of reform laws in the 1970s, which largely favored
emancipation.14 The concept has evolved rapidly in recent decades.
Without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
1363, 1367 (1995).
10
WINICK, supra note 9, at 42.
11
See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 15 (1996) (explaining that the government’s power
includes both “powers to shield vulnerable citizens from harm and to protect society from danger”); see also id. at 26–30 (characterizing most states as adopting
an imminent dangerousness standard).
12
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972) (holding that “Indiana cannot
constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period simply on account
of his incompetency to stand trial . . .”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
574–75 (1975) (explaining that mental illness, without more, is an insufficient
ground for confining a person who is not a danger to herself or others); see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 123, 138 (1990) (explaining the need for informed
consent for voluntary admission to mental hospitals); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 84–86 (1992) (holding that a “[s]tate must have a particularly convincing
reason . . . for [] discriminat[ing] against insanity acquittees who are no longer
mentally ill”).
13
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (holding that a state may
deny a defendant her right to self-representation at trial if doing so under conditions of mental illness would place her dignity at risk).
14
As one advocate put it, “[d]einstitutionalization will have accomplished a
tremendous amount if the mentally ill can live lives of dignity and a reasonable
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The first wave of international human rights law, following World
War II, was based on dignity, was focused on civil and political
rights associated with equality and autonomy, the so-called “negative liberties.”15 In more recent decades, human rights law has
moved towards a concern with the full range of conditions that enable a recognizably human existence. These social, economic, and
cultural rights include treatment of the body and mind, and the processes of suffering, disease and mortality.16
These norms find confirmation in empirically developed insights on the therapeutic effects of legal procedures.17 Moreover, developments in the jurisprudential context of civil commitment have
become even more urgent and practical due to a sweeping change in
the social context of civil commitment. When the last major wave
of civil commitment law reform swept the country, prison population was at a twentieth-century low, as official crime policy continued to shift away from imprisonment as a tool of crime control.18
Meanwhile, state mental hospitals—the major place for incarceration of people with psychiatric disabilities—were in the midst of deinstitutionalization, a population reduction that had begun a decade
earlier and was accelerating.19 In recent memory, these hospitals had
amount of comfort in the community . . . .” H. Richard Lamb, What Did We Really
Expect From Deinstitutionalization?, 32 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 105
(1981). Another example is found in Robert K. Patch, The Mentally Disabled and
His Lawyer, 2 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 34 (1974) (describing mentally disabled
people as being denied their dignity).
15
See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV.
75, 77–78 (2007) (describing “negative rights” as the dominant focus of early human rights work); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND
IDOLATRY 56–57 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) (explaining that “human rights is
only a systematic agenda of ‘negative liberty’”).
16
See Stein, supra note 15, at 78 (describing a second generation of rights
focused on social and cultural needs).
17
WINICK, supra note 9, at 47; see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW 6–7 (2006).
18
JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN & STEVE REDBURN, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 3 (2014) (ebook) (explaining that growth in incarceration began
in the early 1970s).
19
PHIL
BROWN,
THE
TRANSFER
OF
CARE:
PSYCHIATRIC
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 47 (1985) (noting a rapid decline
between 1955 and 1971 in the percentage of psychiatric episodes that were treated
in state hospitals).

2015]

DIGNIFYING MADNESS

11

operated much like prisons without rehabilitation or release dates.20
Indeed, the most significant goal of reform was to place significant
and repeated legal obstacles in the path of further incarceration of
people with psychiatric disabilities who posed no significant risk to
themselves or others and who could receive more effective treatment in the community.21
In the intervening forty years, a revolution in criminal justice
policies led to an enormous expansion of the prison population. As
prison sentences became less individualized through a variety of
mechanisms—including determinate sentences, mandatory minimums, and prosecutorial discretion—unprecedented numbers of
people with serious mental illness found themselves confined in
prisons and jails.22 For a long time this problem was largely invisible, but, since the 1990s, a growing tide of evidence and litigation
has focused attention on the fact that jails and prisons have become
the new mental hospitals. In California, more than a quarter of prisoners are diagnosed with a major mental illness.23 The conditions
facing these prisoners have been especially horrific because prisons
have lost what little capacity for individualized surveillance and care
they once had. These prisons were built to maximize the size of the
confined population and have not emphasized treatment, education,
or training.24 In one of the strongest prisoner-rights decisions in a
generation, a narrow majority of the United States Supreme Court
20

See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569, 576 (describing the
hospital where Donaldson was confined for fifteen years as a “simple regime of
enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed
illness”).
21
WINICK, supra note 9, at 2.
22
See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR.,
MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A
SURVEY OF THE STATES 1 (2010) (finding that, as of 2005, there were “more than
three times more seriously mentally ill people in jails and prisons than in hospitals”).
23
Coleman v. Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1074 (E.D. Cal. 2014).
24
See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A
REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 11
(2014) (discussing California’s prison system and the “zero-sum contest between
the dignity of prisoners and public safety, which promoted deliberate indifference
to the needs of prisoners, from physical and mental health care needs to the need
for decent accommodation free from overcrowding and other forms of cruel and
unusual punishment”).
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recently upheld a gargantuan prison population reduction order
against California.25 The Court focused on the fate of prisoners with
serious psychiatric disabilities, which was extensively documented
in the record.26 Since then, there has been growing recognition of
the cruelty of imprisoning people with severe psychiatric disabilities.27 This recognition provides common ground between consumers or survivors of psychiatric medicine, who view any increase in
coercion as a setback from the gains achieved in the last period of
reform28 and family members, who have in recent years advocated
for more intervention-friendly laws.29
The way to build on that common ground is with a dignity-based
approach to civil commitment law, informed by contemporary de-

25

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922, 1928–29 (2011) (holding that prison
conditions that deny human dignity, including the failure to provide adequate
medical and mental health care, violated the Eight Amendment).
26
Id. The order required the state to reduce its chronic hyper-incarceration
from nearly 200% of its prisons’ design capacity to a mere 137.5% of design capacity within two years. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–24, 1928.
27
See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Mass Imprisonment: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 23,
23–52 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012); Jennifer L. Skeem & Jillian
K. Peterson, Identifying, Treating, and Reducing Risk for Offenders with Mental
Illness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra, at
521 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds., 2012); Craig Haney, The Psychological Effects of Imprisonment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS, supra, at 584 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
28
Michael Rembis, The New Asylums: Madness and Mass Incarceration in
the Neoliberal Era, in DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 139, 152 (Liat Ben-Moshe et al.
eds., 2014) (describing the work of mental health survivors and “mad activists,”
who are concerned about mass incarceration but wary about expanding treatment
powers).
29
See E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S
FAILURE TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 128
(2008) (noting a “massive increase in the number of mentally ill persons in jails
and prisons” as a “consequence of emptying public psychiatric hospitals and then
passing laws that prevent the treatment of individuals after their release”); MARY
BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL xiii (2007) (describing the more than 300,000 people with mental illnesses in prisons and jails as a major reason to reform the system for involuntary treatment).
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velopments in disability human rights and therapeutic jurisprudence. In this essay we discuss three core principles that could provide a way out of the cycles of incarceration and emancipation.30
A. Narrative Autonomy
A dignified approach requires that those subject to commitment
proceedings be treated as persons whose own narrative is given specific and genuine consideration throughout the legal process itself
and in any clinical treatment process that follows. This should be the
approach notwithstanding the gravity of their disease. One way of
conceptualizing this principle is to observe that civil commitment
temporarily separates the narrative side of human dignity from the
executive, or decision-making side, but leaves the former intact. The
suspension of executive autonomy is a harsh blow to human dignity
and should be done with great reluctance. But, it should never mean
a suspension of narrative autonomy. Indeed, the more decision-making autonomy is impeded, the more closely and sincerely narrative
autonomy should be honored.31
B. Minimization of Incarceration
The second core principle is for courts to minimize the chance
and severity of incarceration, while being mindful of the high risks
confinement poses to the dignity and health of people with psychiatric disabilities. Under the parens patriae or police power theories,32 persons who are not an immediate existential threat to themselves or another, should not be incarcerated for treatment under this
30

We make no claim of originality here; these principles are well established
in both human rights law and therapeutic jurisprudence. Our contribution is strategic: we suggest how a reform agenda can take up and build support for these
principles.
31
In Germany (and other European countries), where dignity has formed the
core value behind an elaboration of rules for prisons and psychiatric hospitals,
inmates must be addressed by formal name and with the honorific title used commonly to address a citizen. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 8
(2003).
32
Most states couple this with the closely related form of conservatorship,
which is typically applied when persons with mental illness are unable to care for
themselves sufficiently to assure survival. It is different than a threat to self posed
in civil commitment, which amounts to a suicide risk.
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dignity-based principle. In a society where harsh penal laws and uncompromising policing make it highly likely that many of the most
marginal and vulnerable people will end up detained largely as a
result of their disabilities, the state must minimize detention. It must
also assure that access to treatment is guaranteed and that the length
of incarceration is limited.
When the last wave of civil commitment reform took place, the
potential for hospitals to become places of long-term or permanent
exclusion from the community remained fresh in memory and often
a real threat. Today, incarceration through civil commitment has diminished to the point where it is dwarfed by the number of those
with psychiatric disabilities who inhabit prisons and jails.33 When
hospitalization is ordered, the pressure of institutional incentives,
primarily economic incentives, favors early release.34 Few efforts
are made to re-imprison those who might relapse until they do.35 In
contrast, penal incarceration through criminalization has become
routine to the point of social normality in some communities.36
When it does occur, extended prison terms have become commonplace, and powerful institutional incentives favoring recidivism
make re-incarceration highly likely.37
C. Progressivity
Third, we advocate an approach to civil commitment that recognizes that incarceration is inherently damaging and becomes moreso
with time. The damage is compounded when there is evidence that
incarceration is achieving little positive effect. Even when based on
33

TORREY, supra note 29, at 2, 129 (noting that there were approximately
40,000 Americans in public mental hospitals in 2006, as opposed to an estimated
218,600 seriously mentally ill prisoners in mid-2005).
34
PAUL R. LINDE, DANGER TO SELF: ON THE FRONT LINE WITH AN ER
PSYCHIATRIST 101–02 (2010) (ebook) (describing the legal and insurance pressures on psychiatrists to release patients from involuntary treatment quickly).
35
Id. at 103 (observing the “revolving door” between release and relapse).
36
TRAVIS, supra note 18, at 68 (observing that, “[a]mong recent cohorts of
African American men, 70 percent of those who dropped out of [high] school
served time in state or federal prison”).
37
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 139–41 (2003) (documenting high recidivism rates associated with policies that favor simple custody over the development of rehabilitative programs
in prison or re-entry programs for released prisoners).
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criminal behavior, prison sentences violate the Eighth Amendment
when they continue past the point where further incarceration will
deepen the prisoner’s psychiatric disabilities.38 States have an affirmative obligation to protect the human dignity of their residents
by developing prosecution and sentencing policies that prevent the
state from imprisoning people with psychiatric disabilities, especially for prolonged periods. These three principles have broad support in contemporary human rights law and in academic research on
therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural justice. They form the core
of a dignified civil commitment regime that aims to prevent cycles
of over-incarceration. They also form a practical framework for advancing common ground between multiple stakeholders.
CYCLES OF INCARCERATION AND EMANCIPATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Since this country’s independence, we have witnessed two complete turns of this cycle. The first began as Americans in the early
Republic responded to the wrenching social transformations unleashed by the Revolution. They embraced “asylums” as the socalled new total institutions dedicated to the care of people with psychiatric disabilities.39 By the Civil War, however, the failure of significant new treatments to emerge, and gross underinvestment in operating these total institutions, led to a public scandal over inhumane
treatment and unnecessary confinement in horrible conditions.
Many elites were convinced that new laws should zealously guard
the citizen against involuntary commitment.40
Enthusiasm for incarceration returned at the turn of the twentieth
century. Asylums, now rebranded with terms like “psychopathic
II.

38

See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1244–45, 1258–59 (N.D. Cal.

1995).
39
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC xiv (1st ed. 1971).
40
Id. at 242–43.
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hospital,” were once again seen as an instrument of social improvement.41 Although reformers were venerated as liberators who unbound the mad, they sought less to eliminate confinement than to
reinvent it in new, more medically effective forms. Virtually every
state built public hospitals in the nineteenth century and expanded
them into multi-hospital systems in the twentieth century.42 The latter wave was inspired, in large part, by new concerns for the consequences of eugenics. This was part of the broader reaction to mass
immigration, but it cast in a new light the danger of allowing the
mentally and morally defective to remain free.43
Concerns over the fate of impoverished laborers living in cities
swollen with uneducated immigrants displaced an earlier generation’s concerns about over-incarceration without due process.44
“Progressives” saw expert-guided administrative discretion as the
key to addressing many of the social problems of this class. They
enacted laws from World War I through the Great Depression aimed
at making it easier to imprison individuals believed to be psychiatrically disabled or “defective” with a minimum of legal oversight.45
Despite the promise of more effective short-term hospitalization,
the long-term hospitalized population expanded to unprecedented
levels, peaking in 1955.46 Their poor conditions became a major focus of investigative journalists and political reformers.47
This set the scene for the close of the second cycle. Animated by
evidence that the enlarged hospital system was failing to provide
either treatment or humane conditions, and by the post-War concern
with human rights and civil liberties, reformers went to both courts
and state legislatures. They sought to enact new laws protecting people with mental illness against incarceration. This culminated in key
41
See generally IAN ROBERT DOWBIGGIN, KEEPING AMERICA SANE:
PSYCHIATRY AND EUGENICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 1880 TO 1940
(Cornell University Press, 1997).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26
HARV. L. REV. 302, 311 (1913).
45
DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS:
BRINGING THE MENTALLY DISABLED INTO THE COMMUNITY 4 (2005).
46
WINICK, supra note 9, at 2.
47
PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 210–14 (1994).
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judicial precedents and new statutes from 1965 to 1980.48 It took at
least a decade for new statutes to generate new practice norms and
routines.
The jurisprudence that emerged limited confinement to situations in which the state presents evidence of imminent danger.49 The
Supreme Court held that incarcerating people who are not a threat
to themselves or others, and who are not receiving treatment, violates their right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.50 Although this leaves room under the constitutional
limit for incarcerating people with psychiatric disabilities who are
actually receiving treatment, most states have further limited confinement by adopting “danger to self or others” or “grave disability”
(defined as incapable of self-care or life sustaining activities) standards as the limit on civil commitment authority.51
California’s reform statute became a model for the highly anticarcereal approach to civil commitment law.52 The state followed
the nation in the two cycles of incarceration and emancipation described above, but in a characteristically extreme version.53 When
the state was founded in 1851, California embraced with fervor the

48
See ANDREW T. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND
THE DEVIANT—A RADICAL VIEW 41–58 (2d ed. 1984); BROWN, supra note 19, at

29 (noting that “war had prevented much attention [from] being given to asylum
conditions, but in the postwar period impetus was provided by journalists’ exposés of the hospitals and by lobbying efforts of the mental health professions which
had expanded in wartime service”); RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT,
MADNESS IN THE STREETS: HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE
MENTALLY ILL 109, 125 (1990).
49
See TORREY, supra note 29, at 28 (discussing the origin of the dangerousness standard).
50
See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (holding that “Indiana’s
indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process”).
51
WINICK, supra note 9, at 42.
52
APPELBAUM, supra note 47, at 26–27.
53
California has been at the forefront of most important social, political, and
economic trends since at least the beginning of the twentieth century. See KEVIN
STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM: CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
199 (1985).
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asylum project initiated half a century earlier in the Northeast, building state hospitals on an unprecedented basis.54 While advocates
“back East” emphasized the asylum’s aspirations for treatment, California embraced the asylum largely as a mechanism to segregate a
segment of the population viewed as dangerous, or at least burdensome.55
Waves of domestic migrants arriving from the East, along with
Mexican and Asian immigrants, led to a deficit in social trust and
solidarity.56 This dynamic demography made the state’s voters
prone to anxiety about deviance of all sorts.57 At the same time, Californians’ progressive confidence in the ability of government to
solve problems with science and technology must have made the
mental hospital highly attractive, with its aura of medical treatment.
By the time professional and public opinion began turning against
hospitals in the 1950s, California had one of the highest involuntary
hospitalization rates in the nation58 and a troubling history of human
rights abuses, including forced sterilization of patients.59 The backlash was particularly strong, and the state established an early and
influential approach that would define the extreme wing of the antihospitalization trend. The Lanterman Petris Short Act (LPS Act),
adopted in 1969, established a new substantive legal standard for
coerced treatment or hospitalization.60 No longer would a diagnosis
of mental illness and a doctor’s judgment that an individual would

54

RICHARD W. FOX, SO FAR DISORDERED IN MIND: INSANITY IN
CALIFORNIA, 1870–1930 17–18, 42 (1978).
55
Id. at 17 (explaining that “[f]rom their very beginnings in the 1850s they
were clearly understood to be not simply treatment facilities for the mentally disturbed, but also detention facilities for ‘imbeciles, dotards, idiots, drunkards, simpletons, fools,’ for the ‘aged, the vagabond, the helpless[]’”).
56
David Ward, Population Growth, Migration, and Urbanization, 18601920, in NORTH AMERICA: THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF A CHANGING
CONTINENT 292 (Thomas F. McIlwraith & Edward K. Muller eds., 2d ed. 2002).
57
See generally JOAN DIDION, WHERE I WAS FROM 106–07, 171–73 (2003).
58
FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 206 (1997).
59
DIDION, supra note 57, at 194; TORREY, supra note 58, at 82.
60
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West 2015).
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benefit from treatment suffice. Only when persons with mental illness pose a threat to themselves or others or are shown to be
“gravely disabled” may a court order hospitalization or treatment.61
Under LPS, police have the authority to arrest someone they
have probable cause to believe meets the dangerousness or grave
disability standard as a result of a psychiatric emergency.62 They
may take that person to a hospital where psychiatric professionals
have up to 72 hours to evaluate the person.63 Confinement for treatment after that is generally limited to periods of no more than 14
days based on an ongoing assessment that the person is a threat to
self or others.64 Those who meet the grave disability criteria can be
incarcerated for longer periods, up to 180 days.65 Both these forms
of extended detention and treatment must be approved by a hearing
officer at which the detained individual is entitled to be present and
represented.66
Since the late 1990s, growing recognition of the failure of community treatment programs to become widely available has led to a
movement for legal reforms permitting earlier treatment, if not easier incarceration.67 This recognition has been punctuated by highly
publicized, albeit rare, instances of sudden violence against
61

Id. § 5250. In addition to the new standards, LPS imposed a strict time line.
A person could be held on an emergency basis for up to seventy-two hours for
evaluation. Following that, if medical professionals found that the person continued to pose an imminent threat of violence they could authorize another fourteen
days of custody, an order which could be renewed once for a total of twenty-eight
days. After the first fourteen days the law requires a court to consider whether the
standard is met, and the patient can seek an earlier review through a writ of habeas
corpus. LPS represents the most restrictive of the legal standards adopted by states
in the 1970s under the prod of Supreme Court decisions holding the older permissive admission standards unconstitutional. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
730 (1972); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
62
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2015); see A.B.A., ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-2.1 (1989).
63
Id.
64
WELF. & INST. § 5250; see 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 17:16, Westlaw
(database updated May 2015).
65
WELF. & INST. §§ 5008, 5300; see 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 17:16, supra note 64.
66
WELF. & INST. §§ 5275, 5276.
67
John Petrila & Annette Christy, Florida’s Outpatient Commitment Law: A
Lesson in Failed Reform?, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 21, 21–23 (2008).
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strangers by mentally ill individuals.68 A number of states have
adopted laws allowing forms of “outpatient treatment,” which provide a legal mandate to supervise and provide treatment to a person
with a psychiatric disability whose symptoms are becoming alarming but do not necessarily meet the LPS or similar civil commitment
standards.69 These laws attempt to use the promise of supportive services in the community and the threat of time-limited emergency
incarceration for evaluation, to persuade reluctant patients to resume
a treatment strategy that will be overseen by state professionals.70
Empirical research on the most extensive outpatient commitment
system, New York’s “Kendra’s Law,” 71 suggests that participants
have lower rates of return hospitalizations.72

68

Id.
Id.; see §§ 5349, 5150; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2013);
WELF. & INST. § 5150 (AB 1421) (2002). The primary justification for this form
of treatment is that the population, which the law targets, is currently suffering the
consequences of a critical gap in services between voluntary programs and involuntary commitment. See, e.g., Mental Health: Involuntary Treatment: Hearing on
AB 1421 Before the S. Health and Human Serv.’s Comm., 2002 Legis., 2001-2002
Sess.
9
(Cal.
2002)
(statement
of
Helen
Thomson),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_14011450/ab_1421_cfa_20020621_100959_sen_comm.html. Professor Elyn Saks argues that individuals may not realize the benefits of consistent medication until
they have the opportunity to experience its benefits over time, an opportunity that
assisted outpatient treatment orders can provide. Elyn R. Saks, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 94 (2003). Whether referred
to as “assisted” or “involuntary,” outpatient treatment tends to reflect one’s support or opposition. Opponents usually stress the involuntary aspect or commitment, whereas proponents prefer the kinder, gentler assisted treatment.
70
WELF. & INST. § 5150.
71
Id. It is noteworthy that in both New York and California the outpatient
commitment laws are named after victims of lethal assaults by mentally ill individuals, “Kendra’s Law” (N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60) and “Laura’s Law”
(WELF. & INST. § 5345) respectively. See An Explanation of Kendra’s Law,
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/Kendra_web/Ksummary.htm (last visited August 4, 2015); Laura’s Law, TREATMENT
ADVOC. CTR., http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/lauras-law (last visited
Aug. 4, 2015).
72
John Petrila, M. Susan Ridgely & Randy Borum, Debating Outpatient
Commitment: Controversy, Trends, and Empirical Data, 49 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 157, 161–62 (2003).
69
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However, it is not clear that outpatient commitment laws add
new powers not already present under the prevailing civil commitment regime.73 Most contemporary laws already favor outpatient
treatment when it is clinically effective as a matter of using the least
intrusive means to effectuate the state interest.74 Thus, if outpatient
commitment laws leave in place the existing legal standards for civil
commitment, they seem to offer little promise of preventing overincarceration. If, however, these laws are intended to change the
standard to one that is more facilitative of coercive treatment, they
leave that standard implicit and subject to arbitrary and uncertain
application.75
III. A DIGNITY APPROACH TO CIVIL COMMITMENT
While dignity has been treated as a central topic in both moral
philosophy and theology, it is perhaps in law that reference to the
modern conception of dignity has been most significant in our
time.76 Long limited to issues arising from special status holders like
judges or government officials, dignity has been given a universal
endorsement by post-World War II human rights laws, as noted
above. Despite not appearing in the text of the U.S. Constitution,
dignity has also long figured into the constitutional jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court, especially in the last decade.77

73

This was the late Bruce Winick’s objection to outpatient commitment laws.
See WINICK, supra note 9, at 42, 47.
74
See id.; John D. Cameron, Balancing the Interests: The Move Towards Less
Restrictive Commitment of New York’s Mentally Ill, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 91, 92 (1988).
75
Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment
Law: Kendra’s Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 183, 196–99
(2003) (listing many unanswered questions about Kendra’s Law).
76
JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13 (Meir Dan-Cohen
ed., 2012).
77
See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 169, 171–72 (2011) (noting an increasing prominence of dignity in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and a shift in location from dissenting opinions to
majority opinions and from the Court’s most liberal members to some of its most
conservative).
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The concept of dignity shaping modern law has its roots in two
traditions of the ancient world.78 According to Biblical sources of
the Abrahamic religions, human beings are envisioned as embodying an essential and inalienable dignity.79 This is derived from their
special place in creation, i.e. created in God’s image (b’tzelem Elohim or imago Dei).80 A second conception of dignity emerges from
Greek and Roman conceptions of the legal meaning of noble status.81 High-status male individuals were endowed with dignity.82
This quality was strictly limited to the elite class, and was not so
much earned, as it was reflected in virtuous conduct.83 Over time,
this high-status meaning of dignity has been extended to whole populations through mechanisms like universal national citizenship and
human rights treaties, albeit with uneven results.84
In his recent work, legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has argued that, despite their contradictions, the Greco-Roman concept of
honor and the Judeo-Christian concept of equal relationship to the
divine have merged into modern legal concepts of dignity.85 Of
course, not all of the privileges once accorded to high-status individuals have survived in the development of the modern rights and
privileges of citizenship. However, those that have survived apply
to all of us.86
78

WALDRON, supra note 76, at 30–32 (explaining how the Roman-Greek
conception of dignity was not so much superseded as transvalued by the JudeoChristian conception).
79
Nora Jacobson, Dignity and Health: A Review, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 292,
293 (2007); Margit Cohen & Dieter Grimm, Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Doctrine, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 193, 193
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013).
80
Id.
81
Jacobson, supra note 79, at 293; Cohen & Grimm, supra note 79, at 193.
82
Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity, Human Rights,
and Human Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 661, 666–67 (1998).
83
Id.
84
See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation
of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 660 (2008); Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity 8–13 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-74, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196079.
85
WALDRON, supra note 76, at 14.
86
Waldron frames the project of refining the legal meaning of dignity as “express[ing] the idea of the high and equal rank of every human person . . . we should
look first at the bodies of law that relate status to rank (and to right and privilege)
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“Liberty as Dignity” also stems from Greek and Roman sources,
particularly Cicero, who was among the first philosophers to rely on
the concept, which he tied to rationality.87 The connection between
rationality, liberty, and dignity was at the heart of the most influential modern philosophical treatment of dignity: the works of Immanuel Kant.88
While dignity has thus far had “minimal direct application to the
rights of persons with mental disabilities”89 in the United States, the
exponential increase in the frequency of criminal sentencing has created conditions of widespread degradation that urgently require a
new approach. Confinement of the mad in jails and prisons is part
of a much broader trend that caused the overall level of imprisonment in the U.S. to increase more than five-fold between the 1970s

and see what if anything is retained of these ancient conceptions when dignity is
put to work in a new and egalitarian environment.” Id.
87
See David Luban, Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Massimo Renzo et al. eds.,
forthcoming), at 19–20.
88
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17–
18 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (1785) (noting the relationship between rationality and dignity in man). Kant’s work on dignity has been influentially interpreted by the contemporary U.S. philosopher Alan Gewirth. See Alan Gewirth,
Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 11 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent
eds., 1992) (recognizing how Kant connected human rights, one’s duty to others,
and dignity).
89
Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with
Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights
Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20, 33 (2004).
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and the first decade of this century.90 Sociologists describe this process as “mass imprisonment” or “mass incarceration.”91
Critics dismiss dignity as a legal concept on the ground that it is
too indeterminate and subjective to provide judgments or even guidance to judges and other legal interpreters.92 Some defenders of dignity would seek to narrow its application to norms that moral philosophers can demonstrate with rigorous analysis.93 These truly universal human norms would be products of pure reason, rather than
culturally or historically specific standards.94 On the other hand, we
adopt the alternative approach—the pragmatist approach—that sees
dignity as enhanced and made more objective by historical context.95
A human rights pragmatist, on the other hand, insists
that the meaning of the phrase ‘human dignity’ is not
defined by a philosophical theory, but rather determined by its use in human rights practice. In a sense,
90

There was no direct conversion of the hospitalized population to prison.
Indeed, during the first half of the 1970s, both mental hospitals and prisons saw
their populations dropping. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM
KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA 155 (2001). It was in the 1980s that new policies, promoted by prosecutors and law enforcement and embraced by California’s tough-on-crime governor, George Deukmeijian, began to change sentencing policies that in previous
decades would have kept many people with untreated mental illness, even if they
had remained in the criminal process, from being given state prison sentences.
Many crimes that are particularly easy for people with untreated mental illness to
fall into, like small-scale drug trafficking and burglary, are crimes where mass
incarceration has tipped the scales decisively in favor of incarceration in state
prison. See TORREY, supra note 29, at 39–53 (describing both deinstitutionalization and increasing imprisonment of mentally ill in California)
91
See MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (David
Garland ed., 2001); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
28–29 (2006).
92
See Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 848, 849 (1983).
93
This is sometimes discussed as the “foundationalist” approach to dignity.
See Luban, supra note 87 (noting that foundationalism recognizes that human
rights are universal and can be codified). For an example of such a foundationalist
classic, see Gewirth, supra note 83, at 11 (noting the relationship between dignity
and inherent human rights).
94
Id.
95
Luban, supra note 87, at 20.
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the pragmatist reverses the order of explanation, defining ‘human dignity’ by its inferential commitments rather than the other way around.96
A.
Five Cluster Approach to the History of Dignity
Taking a historical approach can help make sense of what seems
to be a plethora of meanings, even within the narrow lens of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s use of the term. In a recent analysis of the Court’s
treatment of dignity, Professor Leslie Henry identifies five core
meanings that continue to have some relevance in contemporary law
and that share overlapping features.97 However, no single set of factors describes all of them.98 Henry’s five clusters are: “institutional
status as dignity,” “equality as dignity,” “liberty as dignity,” “personal integrity as dignity,” and “collective virtue as dignity.”99 Despite dignity having ongoing relevance in the contemporary period,
his analysis suggests there is also a temporal sequence.100 When
viewed historically, these clusters suggest there can be considerable
reach, but also precision and limits to using dignity to shape constitutional doctrine.101
1. INSTITUTIONAL STATUS AS DIGNITY
For much of the period between the Revolution and the middle
of the twentieth century, dignity was confined largely to the first
category: institutional status as dignity.102 By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the United States renounced the power to
ennoble an aristocracy, but shifted that hierarchical sense of dignity
to the state itself and its officials.103 For much of the next century
and a half, dignity figured into case law mostly as a property of government, especially states and courts.104 This began to change in the
96

Id.
Henry, supra note 77, at 188–90 (“Dignity is not a fixed category, but rather a series of meanings that share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance.”).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 189–90.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 188–90.
102
Id. at 190, 193.
103
Id. at 193–94.
104
Id.
97
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twentieth century and accelerated significantly after World War
II.105
This first phase of the modern emergence of dignity as a strong
source of individual rights took place against the background of the
Holocaust in Europe, the exposure of the crimes of Stalinism in the
Soviet Union, and Jim Crow racism in the southern United States.
These themes echo throughout the jurisprudence. Internationally,
this first dignity wave produced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.106 In Europe, it gave rise to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950.107 The dignity that emerged in
American Constitutional law around this same time was not always
explicitly raised. Rather, it was expressed in more canonical constitutional words and phrases, like “due process,” “liberty,” and
“equality.”108 In Miranda v. Arizona,109 one can find a strong example of the Court’s view of dignity as a larger value underlying many
of the particular protections for the criminal suspect:
“All these policies [regarding the privilege against self-incrimination] point to one overriding thought: . . . the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of
its citizens.”110
Another key expression of this dignity pulse (although, again,
often implicit) was in the jurisprudence of the Warren Court, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education.111

105

Id. at 178.
See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 2
(2010) (discussing context in which UDHR was framed).
107
Id. at 191.
108
Examples of due process cases include the following major criminal procedure decisions: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51, 55 (1961); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759
(1966). Examples of the latter include the following: Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 488 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1967); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 437, 446 (1985).
109
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
110
Id. at 460.
111
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in schools is unequal treatment).
106
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2. DIGNITY AS EQUALITY
Dignity as equality is a theme that finds expression as early as
the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims that “all men are
created equal.”112 In the Constitution, there is a ban on all “title[s]
of nobility.”113 This feature stems directly from the Judeo-Christian
tradition and its premise that the common bond of divine creation
trumps all forms of worldly status.114 The Fourteenth Amendment
gives equality direct expression in its promise of Equal Protection
under state law (and, which the Court has found, binds federal law
as well through the Fifth Amendment).115 While equality can be
conceived as a problem of formal comparisons between specified
groups or individuals,116 the Supreme Court has frequently expressed a concern with how the government treats its citizens based
on their status. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,117 where the
Court held that laws criminalizing marriage between persons of different racial backgrounds were unconstitutional, the Court stated:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis
as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law.118
The Court has also affirmed equal protection of the law for certain vulnerable minority groups, even without a finding of “suspect
classification” or “fundamental right.”119 Protection is warranted
112

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
113
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No title of nobility shall be granted by the
United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any
title of nobility.”); see Henry, supra note 77, at 200 (quoting uses of dignity by
Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton).
114
Jacobson, supra note 79, at 293.
115
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
116
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687 (1888) (discussing equal protection and enforcement of the laws “among those engaged in the same business”).
117
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
118
Id. at 12.
119
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435–36; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
635 (1996) (holding that gays and lesbians are protected under the Equal Protection Clause).
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where the law or classification in question expresses hostility toward
a group that is incompatible with the state’s responsibility toward
the dignity of its citizens.120 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,121 the Court extended protections to regulations that negatively classified the intellectually disabled in terms that unusually
invoked dignity explicitly:
For the retarded, just as for Negroes and women, much has
changed in recent years, but much remains the same; out-dated statutes are still on the books, and irrational fears or ignorance, traceable
to the prolonged social and cultural isolation of the retarded, continue to stymie recognition of the dignity and individuality of retarded people.122
In Romer v. Evans,123 the Court overturned a Colorado initiative
that banned municipalities from enacting gay rights protections in
terms that invoke this proper respect for the citizen, stating:
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this
sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance.124
3. LIBERTY AS DIGNITY
Liberty is also a key feature of the high court’s post-World War
II dignity jurisprudence. Concern for dignity as liberty runs through
the Warren Court’s decisions on free speech125 and many criminal

120

Id.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
122
Id. at 467.
123
517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that gays and lesbians are protected under the Equal Protection Clause). _
124
Id. at 633.
125
Henry, supra note 77, at 173 (noting the importance of free expression (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971))). The Fourth Amendment’s right
to be free from unreasonable seizures was applied to even brief street encounters.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). In Terry, the Court does not explicitly
use the term “dignity,” but it is clearly concerned with the indignity of being subjected to even a brief interference with one’s business. See id.
121
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procedure decisions, but finds its strongest expression in the right to
privacy— culminating in the right to abortion.126
4. PERSONAL INTEGRITY AS DIGNITY
Much of this first dignity wave in US constitutional law took
place from the 1950s through the 1970s in the Warren Court and the
first part of the Burger Court.127 During the Rehnquist Court, this
modest dignity trend went into a “period of hibernation” in the
1980s and 1990s.128 During this period, state interests and administrative discretion increasingly trumped concerns about human dignity.129 It is tempting to attribute the waning of the first phase to the
Court’s rightward trend under the increasingly conservative appointments of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The second wave, however, that is emerging today during the Roberts Court
has come when the Court is no less conservative. Indeed, some of
the most important “dignity opinions” have come from the Court’s
conservative majority.130

126

See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause ensures that married and unmarried individuals will be
treated alike concerning contraceptive use); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (relating the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy, and personal
liberty to a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion); Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (finding the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act unconstitutional based on principles of liberty).
127
The Warren Court’s dignity jurisprudence has already been discussed. See
supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 9 (1970). Perhaps the
strongest dignity opinion of the era took place after Justice Warren was replaced
by the more conservative Chief Justice Warren Burger. The most important example is Furman v. Georgia, which uses the word “dignity” no less than twenty
times. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
128
Henry, supra note 77, at 171–72.
129
Id.
130
See id.; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (upholding the federal law Partial-Birth Abortions Ban Act of 2003, which was intended to “express[] respect for the dignity of human life”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
594 (2006) (explaining that the “knock-and-announce” rule protects an individual’s privacy and dignity by giving the person an opportunity to “collect oneself”
before the police enter).
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Instead, the shift since the 1990s is one in emphasis. The key
decisions of the early period, mostly in criminal procedure, highlighted the equality and especially the liberty aspects of respect for
human dignity.131 This came into direct conflict with the massive
expansion in aggressive policing and prosecution associated with
the war on crime and drugs and mass incarceration.132 The renewal
of dignity taking place in recent cases emphasizes a very different
aspect, which Professor Henry describes as “personal integrity as
dignity.”133 This invokes very different practical demands on the
state. Whereas liberty or even equality mostly call for negative
rights, or forbearance of state intervention, dignity as integrity attends to one’s lived experience and the physical and social relations
necessary to sustain the human body and a human life. Dignity as
integrity highlights “people who become vulnerable to their circumstances, express unharnessed appetites, and expose their bodily nakedness or mental fragility.”134
In recent cases, the Court has revitalized some traditional limits
on state power. For example, in Hudson v. Michigan,135 Justice
Scalia explained the constitutional significance of the common law
“knock-and-announce” rule, which protects individual dignity by affording “the opportunity to collect oneself before answering the
door.”136
131

See cases cited supra note 108.
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 130–31 (2007) (describing the response of the judicial system to the war on
crime).
133
Henry, supra note 77, at 215. This line of thought has origins in classical
thought: Aristotle’s virtue ethics. See Id. “Personal integrity as dignity” is also
expounded upon by contemporary philosophers, such as Martha Nussbaum. See
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 159–60 (2006) (writing that the “capabilities approach sees
the world as containing many different types of animal dignity, all of which deserve respect and even awe”).
134
Henry, supra note 77, at 212.
135
547 U.S_586 (2006).
136
The rule, which has its origins in the common law of England, requires the
police to signal their presence and intent to enter before forcing the entry. Hudson,
547 U.S. at 588, 594. The delay required is very brief and is expressly not a sufficient amount of time for a resident to escape or destroy evidence of a crime. See
id. Although the Court in Hudson ultimately refused to suppress evidence gather
132
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This notion of dignity has also been visible in a series of Eighth
Amendment decisions in which the Court has ruled out certain punishments by instituting bans on sentencing juveniles to death137 or
life imprisonment without parole for a non-homicide crime.138 Perhaps the most significant recent invocation of this notion of dignity
as decency is the above-referenced Brown v. Plata decision, which
found that California’s chronically overcrowded and medically under-resourced prisons had created a risk of suffering equivalent to
torture—one which was “incompatible with the concept of human
dignity and has no place in civilized society.”139
5. COLLECTIVE VIRTUE AS DIGNITY
The pairing of “human dignity” and “civilized society” (and in
other instances “a decent society”) suggests that states may have distinct responsibilities and concurrent powers that extend beyond
those that have historically provided the legal foundations for civil
commitment.140 In Gonzales v. Carhart,141 the Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which banned certain methods of performing late-term abortions.142 After describing
in violations of this rule, it did reaffirm its constitutional status as part of the
Fourth Amendment requirements of a reasonable search. See id. The expression
“collect oneself” is an almost poetic invocation of dignity as personal integrity,
and it beautifully reminds us how much this depends on both belongings and social arrangements or norms.
137
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
138
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
139
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
140
See Henry, supra note 77, at 222–23.
141
550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). There is a clear parallel between the Court’s
invocation of decency and civilization in the Eighth Amendment cases like Brown
v. Plata and their deployment in Gonzales v. Carhart, even though the Court split
in very different directions. Both share a focus on the dignitary treatment of the
human body, complete with gory descriptions of medical procedures in Gonzales
and photographs evocative of great human suffering in Brown. See id. at 135–40;
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–27. Unlike the much controverted “regret” aspect of
Gonzales, the dignitary interest in barring certain atrocious uses of human bodies
seems to rest on a more objective foundation. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60.
The pairing of Gonzales and Brown suggests that both the left and the right of the
Court are responsive to the personal integrity and collective virtue aspects of the
new dignity jurisprudence.
142
18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012).
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the physical nature of these methods and the difficulty of differentiating them from acts of deliberately killing a newborn infant, the
Court held that Congress could constitutionally bar these methods
as incompatible with “respect for the dignity of human life.”143 One
does not have to agree with the Court’s outcome or specific reasoning in Gonzales to see something promising in its recognition that
state power exists beyond the narrow confines of parens patriae and
police power to protect the community’s interest in common human
dignity, not just on an individual basis, but collectively.144 In many
respects, this is the flip side of dignity as personal integrity. Conversely, an exercise of state power that risks the disintegration of a
person (and thus the loss of dignity as personal integrity) would expose the collective or community authority as being indecent, inhuman, or uncivilized.
In the case with the most direct relevance to civil commitment
law, Indiana v. Edwards, the Court upheld a trial court’s refusal to
allow a defendant with a serious psychiatric disability (schizophrenia) to represent himself in a criminal case.145 This is because selfrepresentation carries a greater risk than representation through
counsel that the resulting spectacle will not “affirm the dignity” of
the individual.146
B. Dignity-Based Reform
This shift in the focus of dignity jurisprudence from the midtwentieth century to the early twenty-first century may be characterized as a second phase of the last reform period when many of the

143

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–60.
We think the Court should have struck down the ban despite the state interest in this kind of common decency because of the plaintiff’s very significant
countervailing dignity interest in controlling her reproductive organs and the long
history of state and federal governments claiming to protect women against their
reproductive choices.
145
554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
146
Id. at 176. The 7-2 vote in Edwards suggests that a majority of the current
Court might allow hospitalization to preserve the “dignity as personal integrity”
of a person with mental illness, caught up in what we have called madness. This
is a context where conditions like homelessness, self-medication with dangerous
drugs, and the heavy hand of law enforcement pose an unacceptable risk of irreversible disintegration.
144
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nation’s laws were amended to protect the liberty and equality of
people with psychiatric disabilities.
The cause of this surge in concern for the dignity of people with
psychiatric disabilities in the 1950s was undoubtedly the exposure
of mass human rights violations against civilian populations carried
out by the Nazis and echoed in features of allied conduct as well.147
Governments in the mid-twentieth century had proven all too willing to detain populations en masse that they deemed dangerous. This
included the United States, which had detained its Japanese citizens
and residents. The belief that people with disabilities could be managed to achieve primarily social hygiene goals was disturbingly
close to the genocidal impulses of Third Reich social policy.
The concerns regarding dignity as respect for personal freedom
or autonomy have not so much faded, as they have joined with concerns over the threat to dignity posed by incarceration in jails and
prisons lacking treatment or individualized assessment. These concerns cannot simply be collapsed into the earlier ones. Respect for
autonomy could well justify incarcerating psychiatrically disabled
and vulnerable people whose conduct is felonious meets the legal
definition of a felony. Dignity reflected in the fragility of human
integrity, and in the regard a “decent society” has for that fragility,
can complete the reforms of almost a half century ago.
We believe that three core principles can provide guidance for
revising the reformed statutes of the 1970s: (1) the principle of narrative autonomy;148 (2) the principle of minimization of incarceration;149 and (3) the principle of progressivity.150 Each of these, as we
shall now attempt to show, protects the interests of psychiatrically
disabled people in equality of civic standing and autonomy, but with
a commitment to personal integrity and collective virtue that was
left out of the 1970s reform argument.
1. NARRATIVE AUTONOMY
Dignity has been associated with the autonomy of the individual
at least since the influential work of German philosopher Immanuel
147
148
149
150

BROWN, supra note 19, at 7.
See infra III.B.1 Narrative Autonomy.
See infra III.B.2 Minimizing Incarceration.
See infra III.B.3 Principles of Progressivity.
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Kant in the late eighteenth century.151 Narrative autonomy can be
honored even when there are good reasons for limiting liberty of
action and decision-making, e.g., if a person is imprisoned for a
crime. It can also be honored even when equality is denied, e.g., a
child or a subordinate in a formal organizational hierarchy.
The late Ronald Dworkin provided one of the most influential
accounts of this aspect of dignity.152 Dworkin argues that individuals have an interest in being treated with respect, even when they
have justifiably been relieved of decisional autonomy or no longer
have a meaningful capacity for decisional autonomy.153 He writes:
“[I]f his choices and demands, no matter how firmly expressed, systematically or randomly contradict one another, reflecting no coherent sense of self and no discernable even short-term aims, then he
has presumably lost the capacity that it is the point of autonomy to
protect.”154 But, the departure of agency does not change the significance of dignity in guiding how that person should be treated. As
Dworkin notes, “A person’s right to be treated with dignity . . . is
the right that others acknowledge his genuine critical interests: that
they acknowledge that he is the kind of creature, and has the moral
standing, such that it is intrinsically, objectively important how his
life goes.”155
Legal philosopher David Luban describes this aspect of dignity
as honoring a person’s “being” rather than her “willing”:
Honoring someone’s human dignity means honoring
their being, not merely their willing. Their being
transcends the choices they make. It includes the way
they experience the world—their perceptions, their
passions and sufferings, their reflections, their relationships and commitments, what they care about.156

151

KANT, supra note 88, at 43.
RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 233–37 (1993).
153
Id. at 225.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 236.
156
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 76 (2007).
152
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Even as it succeeds in achieving the liberty of the person, current
law fails to obtain respect for dignity in the sense of narrative autonomy. For those in situations of madness, assailed not only by symptoms, but also by homelessness, victimization, and/or incarceration,
autonomy as liberty is often an empty autonomy. In contrast, a
growing body of research suggests that narrative autonomy remains
important to people in legal proceedings.157
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Narrative Autonomy
The idea that facilities should respect the narrative autonomy of
a person with psychiatric disabilities undergoing coerced treatment
is supported by empirical research. Researchers in the MacArthur
studies on outcomes in psychiatric interventions found that, independent of the decision to commit, the person’s subjective sense of
coercion was lessened with “the degree of respect with which the
treatment provider dealt with the patient.”158 From this perspective,
a full civil commitment hearing is an opportunity to provide the subjects with an opportunity to be heard. By telling their story to a
judge, a figure of both real and symbolic authority, individuals undergoing stressful symptoms and circumstances receive respect before the law and powerful reinforcement of their essential dignity.159
Empirical research confirms this result, even when the subjects in
question believe “what they say is having little or no influence over
the third-party authority.”160 Professor Tom Tyler and his colleagues

157

See Mark R. Munetz et al., Mental Health Court and Assisted Outpatient
Treatment: Perceived Coercion, Procedural Justice, and Program Impact, 65
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 352, 357 (2014) (concluding that mental health courts
achieve less coercion, more procedural justice, and more satisfaction because
judges treat subjects with respect and listen to them); Sarah Kopelovich et al.,
Procedural Justice in Mental Health Courts: Judicial Practices, Participant Perceptions, and Outcomes Related to Mental Health Recovery, 36 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 113, 118 (2013) (finding procedural justice correlated with fewer
symptoms and more satisfaction).
158
WINICK, supra note 9, at 25. Professor Winick goes on to explain that
“those subjected to psychiatric hospitalization against their will may suffer a serious loss of dignity and of self-esteem and self-efficacy.” Id. at 47.
159
Id. at 147–48.
160
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 440 (1992).
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found, across a variety of legal proceedings (including civil commitment), that the perception of the legitimacy of the resulting incarceration is increased by “the extent to which the patient was afforded
an opportunity to express his or her opinion on the admission decision [and] . . . the extent to which what the patient had to say was
taken seriously.”161
Voice is one of several dignity-enhancing elements that procedures can either assure or ignore. Others include whether (1) the decision maker appears neutral, (2) the individual who is subject to
confinement is permitted to participate meaningfully, and (3) the individual is treated by the authorities in a manner worthy of dignity
and trust.162 The evidence is consistent and strong that these procedural features create a positive feeling toward the individual’s encounter with the law, even where the procedural outcome goes
against the subject’s stated wishes.163 A procedure that communicates respect for the subject and his dignity may be especially important for those with mental illness, who often “already have been
marginalized and stigmatized by a variety of social mechanisms . . . .”164
b. International Human Rights Law and Narrative
Autonomy
International human rights treaties, declarations, and developments in human rights law also reflect a growing parallel concern
with narrative autonomy, directly linked to the legal value of conserving human dignity. These include key documents, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);165 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);166 International
161
See WINICK, supra note 9, at 25 (first citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26–34 (1988); then
citing TOM R. TYLER AND YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002)).
162
Tyler, supra note 160, at 439–41.
163
Id. at 436–37.
164
WINICK, supra note 9, at 146.
165
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
166
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble, art. 10,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);167
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCPD);168 and regional treaties.169 This concern is also referenced in the German constitution,170 in the South African constitution,171 and in the jurisprudence of many national supreme
courts.172
167

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, preamble, art. 13, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR].
168
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature May 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008) [hereinafter
CRPD]. The Convention’s Preamble begins with “[r]espect for inherent dignity,”
which is listed along with “individual autonomy” and “independence of persons.”
Id. at art. 3(a) (suggesting that dignity means something more than autonomy).
169
Although surprisingly not the preamble to the most elaborate of all treaties
or regional charters, the language of the European Convention on Human Rights
is nearly identical in most of its substantive provisions to other documents, seeming to adopt dignity by implication, and the preamble to the convention does cite
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is also clearly the source of
many of its substantive provisions. See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 5, 52, http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter ECHR]. However, the word “dignity” only enters
the text of the European Convention with Optional Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning abolition of the death penalty, which was promulgated in 2002. The protocol
preamble begins: “[c]onvinced that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a
democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the
protection of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all
human beings. . . .” Id. at 52.
Also, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which took effect in 2009, contains an entire chapter devoted to dignity. See EUROPEAN UNION
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, ch. 1, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf, ch. 1 (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter EUCFR].
170
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] [Constitution] (Ger.), translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/.
171
S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
172
See Oliver Lepsius, Human Dignity and the Downing of Aircraft, 7 GER.
L.J. 761, 763–64 (2006) (recognizing that the German Federal Constitutional
Court held that a law permitting the shooting down of an airplane carrying innocent passengers in terrorist attack situations violated the guarantee of human dignity); Ariel L. Bendor & Michael Sachs, The Constitutional Status of Human Dignity in Germany and Israel, 44 ISR. L.R. 25, 29 (2011) (noting that Israel’s Supreme Court, in Katalan v. Prison Services, held that “prison walls do not bar the
prisoner from human dignity”); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality
v. Minister of Justice 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at 2–4 (S. Afr.) (holding that
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The UNCPD preamble begins with “[r]espect for inherent dignity,” which is proclaimed along with “individual autonomy” and
“independence of persons.”173 It is this aspect of dignity that also
informs the sweeping opening lines of the UDHR preamble:
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”174 It is restated
in the Declaration’s very first article.175 This general promise of dignity is a key feature of the opening articles of the ICCPR,176 the
ICESCR,177 and regional treaties.178 While these broad principles
create a “common standard” for human rights, they have had “minimal direct application to the rights of persons with mental disabilities.”179
A second strand of meaning concerns the specific rights of individuals that comprise the elements of a dignified life. Abrogation of
these rights would constitute a negation of the general promise of
dignity. This strand is most evident in the political and civil rights
enumerated in the UDHR and subsequent human rights treaties.

laws prohibiting sodomy violate the constitutional right to human dignity); Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 781 (Can.) (finding that capital punishment
could constitute a serious violation of human dignity).
173
CRPD, supra note 168, at art. 3(a) (suggesting that dignity means something more than autonomy).
174
UDHR, supra note 165.
175
Id. at art. 1 (“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another
in a spirit of brotherhood.”).
176
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble, art. 10,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR].
177
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, preamble, art. 13, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR].
178
Surprisingly, this principle is not in the preamble to the most elaborate of
all regional charters, the European Union’s Human Rights charter. See ECHR,
supra note 169. This omission has been corrected in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, which took binding effect in 2009 and contains an
entire chapter devoted to dignity. See id.; see also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and
American
Convention
on
Human
Rights
(1948),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/declaration.asp.
179
Gostin & Gable, supra note 89, at 33.
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These include the rights to assembly, speech, and political participation, either directly or through representatives in government.180
From the perspective of people with mental illness and the government of madness, it is striking that these provisions reflect great confidence in the state to carry out interventions based on welfare and
policing without risk to dignity.
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and article 3 of its more
comprehensive regional counterpart, the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), declare that “no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”181
Consistent with Article 5, detention for the purpose of appropriate
medical treatment does not violate Article 3.182 Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the potential for abuse
is so great in involuntary commitment that courts must carefully
consider the individual circumstances of confined persons to determine whether that detention has become “inhuman or degrading.”183
A similar balance has been struck by the United Nations General
Assembly which, in 1991, adopted Resolution 46/119 titled “[t]he
protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of
mental health care.”184 This resolution places dignity as the second
180

UDHR, supra note 165, at arts. 18–21.
The U.N. Declaration includes the word “cruel” as well, providing in full,
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.” See UDHR, supra note 165, at art. 5.
182
“As a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be
regarded as inhuman or degrading.” Herczegfalvy v. Austria, App. No. 10533/83,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992); see also Philip Fennell, Doctor Knows Best? Thereapeutic
Detention Under Common Law, the Mental Health Act, and the European Convention, 6 MED. L.R. 322, 324 (1998) (stating “Article 5 allows detention on
grounds of unsoundness of mind, provided it is carried out in accordance with a
procedure prescribe by law . . . .”).
183
See Herczegfalvy v. Austria, App. No. 10533/83, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992)
(stating that a position of “inferiority and powerlessness” typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals, calls for increased vigilance in reviewing compliance with Convention). The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers has also
adopted a recommendation concerning protection of the human rights and dignity
of persons with mental disorder. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS, Recommendation No. Rec (2004)10, (adopted Sept. 22, 2004),
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=775685 [hereinafter Rec (2004)10].
184
G.A Res. 46/119, annex, Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care (Dec. 17, 1991).
181
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of its “fundamental freedoms and basic rights,”185 and it includes as
a guiding principle that the “treatment of every patient shall be directed towards preserving and enhancing personal autonomy.”186 As
a further condition of involuntary treatment, the Resolution declares: “Where any treatment is authorized without the patient’s informed consent, every effort shall nevertheless be made to inform
the patient about the nature of the treatment and any possible alternatives and to involve the patient as far as practicable in the development of the treatment plan.”187
As with much of human rights law, the resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly function as a form of “soft law.”188 They operate
on a level beneath the broad prefaces and specific clauses of human
rights treaties in a penumbra of positive norms adopted by member
governments. Governments may be obliged to adopt these provisions as practice objectives for their own institutions, rather than
rights that can be easily enforced in court. At that the same, time
they constitute standards against which institutions—and the governments that maintain them—are regularly reviewed by other organizations, such as the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and
the European Court of Human Rights.
Another way soft law can influence hard law is by modeling approaches that can be adopted in part or in whole by states and subnational governments. The European and UN resolutions offer dignity-based models for reforming civil commitment law in the United
States. As against the LPS reform statutes, this approach stands out
in three ways and each approach is connected to a different way in
which madness challenges dignity. First, the human-rights approach
suggests a basis for intervention that is more care-oriented than the
violence-prevention ethic embodied in the dangerousness standard.
185

Id. at Principle 1 (“All persons with a mental illness, or who are being
treated as such persons, shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person.”).
186
Id. at Principle 11.
187
Id.
188
See generally David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law
in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 11 EUR. L.J. 343 (2005) (discussing the way guidelines work with more binding forms of law to achieve coordination in Europe with a focus on labor and
employment rights).
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Waiting for treatment until persons are deemed a danger of violence
to themselves or others is a denial of human dignity.
Second, the human-rights approach insists that intervention be
the least intrusive or restrictive. The 1970s reform era put too much
emphasis on the in-and-out decision about hospitalization and not
enough on providing the best balance of liberty and care that is
achievable. This has led to campaigns for assisted outpatient treatment laws as a supplement to civil commitment in some states. The
human-rights approach eliminates the need for a separate legal
standard by insisting that treatment always be in the “least intrusive”
or “least restrictive” setting possible.
Third, the human-rights approach makes it imperative that authorities consult with persons subject to mandatory treatment and
take their participation into consideration, both in the design of an
individualized treatment program and in prioritizing convergence
with the subject’s preferences at the earliest possible point.
Individuals with psychiatric disabilities who are coerced into
treatment are in an inescapably undignified position. When confined
and forced to take mind-altering chemicals, their autonomy over
their physical and mental world is violated in a profound way. However, this violation of autonomy is not identical to a violation of dignity. Involuntarily committed individuals can be shown respect.
They can be listened to. They can develop meaningful relationships
with their caretakers and can become invested in, and proud of, their
progress.189 However, as research on consumer law shows, legal
rights do not always translate into meaningful voices.190
2. MINIMIZING INCARCERATION
Throughout this article, we have used the term “incarceration”
to refer to both psychiatric hospitalization and imprisonment. But,
whatever its intentions, and however promising its resources for
treatment, detention in a hospital or prison poses inevitable risks to
189

One common way to frame the importance of dignity for mentally ill individuals receiving treatment is to refer to them as consumers or survivors, instead
of patients. But, as noted above, there are no safe harbors when it comes to discerning acceptable and appropriate nomenclature.
190
See Shauhin A. Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How
Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of Consumer Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV.
527, 553–56 (2009).
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the human dignity of all people, especially those with psychiatric
disabilities. In this regard, we share with consumer advocates a
sense that coerced confinement, no matter how well-justified, will
continue to be problematic for people who can see to their own survival in the community (parens patriae), and who are not an imminent threat to themselves or others (the police power).191 But, even
more weight must be given to preventing the pattern by which people with chronic psychiatric illness end up incarcerated as punishment. These individuals face severe risk of progressive illness, victimization, and suicide. A dignified approach to civil commitment
should explicitly seek to minimize the overall amount and depth of
incarceration that befalls the mad. In the 1970s, that could be done
simply by limiting hospitalization to those who posed a serious risk
of doing harm to people, or in some states, to property.192 Since the
rise of mass imprisonment, that strategy has failed for a staggering
number of people with psychiatric disabilities.193
In the 1970s, no one necessarily advocated moving people with
mental illness into the criminal justice system, nor was it a feared
outcome. Penal procedures, from police through prisons, had been
receiving substantial attention from a Supreme Court that appeared
protective of defendants’ due process rights.194 Criminal justice does
191

Indeed, this was Professor Winick’s position. See WINICK, supra note 9, at
47 (“Therapeutic jurisprudence and constitutional considerations thus both support a narrow scope for involuntary civil commitment.”).
192
In the 1980s, for example, some states, like Washington, began to broaden
their standards for commitment, as concerns about failures of treatment grew in
the community. See Mary L. Durham & Glenn L. Pierce, Beyond Deinstitutionalization: A Commitment Law in Evolution, 33 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
216, 218–19 (1982).
193
See TORREY, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.9, at 128 (discussing large numbers of prisoners with psychiatric disorders).
194
Reform of civil commitment followed a decade or more of Supreme Court
decisions increasing the reach of constitutional rights for criminal defendants. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (evidence collected without a warrant
cannot be used in state court); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966)
(criminal suspects in police custody must be warned of their right to remain silent
and have a lawyer to advise and accompany them); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
164, 487 (2008) (interrogation must cease once a suspect in custody has asked for
a lawyer and cannot resume until the lawyer has met with the suspect). None of
these rights applied to the civil commitment process in the 1970s. Since then, a
right to a formal hearing and representation by counsel has been clearly established. See WINICK, supra note 9, at 141.
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assure a fuller range of due process rights and greater formal recognition of equality of citizenship between persons with psychiatric
disabilities and those without. But, in an era of mass incarceration,
when government has criminalized a broad array of social problems,195 this practice has become powerfully counter-productive to
the original goals of protecting civil rights and liberties.196
Public attitudes about crime and punishment were still in the
process of hardening into law-and-order populism during the last
wave of reform. State statutes remained largely oriented toward rehabilitation197and the number of incarcerated persons nationwide
was at or near a twentieth century low. Moreover, the entire prison
population was a fraction of the size of the total mental health institutional population.198 However, a decade or two later, popular attitudes and legislative activity had taken a decided turn toward punishment. Incarceration increased in scale, intensity and length of
sentence.199 Today, the national imprisonment rate remains near an
all-time high,200 and the prisons hold many times the number of
mentally ill people confined in mental hospitals.201
As noted above, the Supreme Court upheld a sweeping population cap on California prisons and, at the same time, let stand a systemic remedy for decades-long deficits in health care.202 While the
population reduction was intended to make improvements in mental
health treatment feasible, there is no evidence that prisoners with

195

JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR (2009).
196
Simon, supra note 27 (describing inhumane conditions for prisoners with
psychiatric disabilities in California prisoners).
197
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 3 (2001) (describing “penal welfarism” as
the dominant approach to punishment through the 1970s).
198
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53,
55–63 (2011).
199
GARLAND, supra note 197, at 8–9; Simon, supra note 195, at 18–30.
200
U. ALB., HINDELANG CRIM. JUST. RES. CTR., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
STATISTICS
TABLE
(2009),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6292009.pdf.
201
See TORREY, supra note 22, at 1.
202
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–26 (2011).
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psychiatric disabilities are receiving constitutionally adequate treatment.203
Trying to repair the prison mental health delivery systems is a
perverse way to address the inhumanity caused by long-term incarceration of people with serious mental illness. To protect the human
dignity of people with psychiatric disabilities, civil commitment law
should require judges to take into account this kind of carceral balance. A judge must find that the risk of incarceration is serious and
that hospitalization with treatment and suitable follow-up care
would reduce the overall length and severity of incarceration.204
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Minimization of
Incarceration
The late Bruce Winnick, the leading proponent of therapeutic
jurisprudence-based civil commitment reform, opposed both outpatient commitment reforms and expansive changes to parens patriae
or police power bases for civil commitment.205 His opposition was
on the ground that coercion was counter-therapeutic and should be
reserved for those so disabled as to be a threat to their own survival
or to others.206 He clearly endorsed the principle of narrative autonomy. It is noteworthy that Professor Winick, whose therapeutic jurisprudence approach to revising civil commitment law has guided
our own, did not see the major threat of the now widely recognized

203

In one of his last orders from the bench, Judge Lawrence Karlton denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss a case related to Brown v. Plata. Coleman v.
Brown, 938 F. Supp. 2d 955, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2013). He found that “[s]ystemic
failures persist in the form of inadequate suicide prevention measures, excessive
administrative segregation of the mentally ill, lack of timely access to adequate
care, insufficient treatment space and access to beds, and unmet staffing
needs . . . [T]hese objectively unconstitutional conditions evidence the subjective
component of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 989.
204
In practice, combined with the principle of narrative autonomy, this should
result in something very much like the combination of services and outpatient
treatment mandated by current reforms like Kendra’s Law in New York or
Laura’s Law in California. See sources cited supra note 71.
205
See generally WINICK, supra note 9, at 6–11 (outlining elements for the
“Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model of Civil Commitment” explored throughout
the book).
206
See generally id.
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mass imprisonment of people with psychiatric disabilities.207 At the
same time, it is difficult to imagine that he would have been complacent about the mass-incarceration of people with mental illness
and psychiatric disorders.208
Today, no one on any side of the debate about the hospitalization
of people with mental illness can ignore the striking number of persons with psychiatric disabilities ending up in penal institutions and
sometimes in the harshest possible versions.209 As a result of policies aimed at increasing the overall flow of troubled citizens to prisons, there has been a gradual, but now severe, accumulation of persons with psychiatric disabilities inside the nation’s supersized
prison systems.210
3. PROGRESSIVITY
Incarceration is always a powerful challenge to human dignity,
especially when the imprisoned person has a serious psychiatric disability. Any civil commitment system anchored in human dignity
will seek to assure that every authorized incarceration rapidly advances the person toward emancipation and a stable life in the community, while honoring the subject’s treatment preferences as much
207

His major treatise on the topic fails to even discuss incarceration. See generally id.
208
Indeed, Professor Winick’s pioneering work promoting drug courts was
powerfully motivated by a desire to reduce over-reliance on incarceration. Cf.
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 481 (2002) (discussing drug treatment
court positively and writing that “sentencing [drug offenders] to prison did not
change their addictive behavior. Instead, it led to a revolving door effect . . . . An
important insight of therapeutic jurisprudence is that . . . drug treatment court
judges consciously view themselves as therapeutic agents”).
209
Under pressure from a federal court, California—which keeps the largest
number of prisoners with psychiatric disabilities incarcerated—recently announced plans to remove most of their mentally ill prisoners from extreme isolation units, where they have languished for decades, despite a court ruling in the
1990s banning prisoners with psychiatric disabilities from being housed at one of
the state’s Security Housing Units at Pelican Bay. See Erica Goode, Federal
Judge Approves California Plan to Reduce Isolation of Mentally Ill Inmates, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/california-plansto-reduce-isolation-of-mentally-ill-inmates.html?_r=1.
210
See Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S. Incarceration Rate,
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 216 (2013).
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as possible.211 Where a person requires prolonged hospitalization,
while waiting for treatment to take effect or due to long-term incapacity, the environment should be the least restrictive and as closely
linked to normal life in the community as is possible (normalization). Reassessments must also take place on a regular and individualized basis, including the procedural opportunities for narrative
autonomy noted above. The goal is to protect the future interest in
the autonomy of the person undergoing any involuntary treatment.
This is accomplished by reducing the established tendency of incarceration to negatively alter behavior and self-understanding in ways
that are profoundly anti-therapeutic and that tend to reproduce
“symptoms” that justify incarceration.212
Prolonged incarceration in a hospital setting of the sort suffered
by Mr. Donaldson in O’Connor v. Donaldson213 may no longer be
the norm. For a portion of people with psychiatric disabilities, hospitalization has been replaced by a pattern of repeated short-term
detentions for emergency evaluation, sometimes followed by a
longer term in jail or prison.214 This is not wholly a product of the
current civil commitment legal standards. A major factor is the scarcity of appropriate and available psychiatric residential or community-based placements.215 Indeed, this is a global phenomenon.216
211
We take the view that, until scientists better understand treatment appropriateness to individual symptoms, a person undergoing a stable agreed-upon
treatment plan will likely survive in the community without further incarcerations
(of hospitals or prisons) longer than she would otherwise. That same person will
likely have an increased subjective sense of well-being.
212
Sociological analysis of the role of custodial regimes in creating the behavioral patterns associated with mental illness informed the reforms of the 1970s.
See APPELBAUM, supra note 47, at 7–9. Especially important was ERVING
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS
AND OTHER INMATES (1961).
213
422 U.S. 563, 564 (1975) (noting that Donaldson was held against his will
for nearly fifteen years at the time of his court-ordered release).
214
LINDE, supra note 34, at 101–03.
215
E. Fuller Torrey et al., The Shortage of Public Hospital Beds for Mentally
Ill Persons, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/imd/shortage-hosp-beds.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
216
Jodi Morris et al., Global Mental Health Resources and Services: A WHO
Survey of 184 Countries, 34 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1 (2012), http://www.publichealthreviews.eu/upload/pdf_files/12/00_Morris.pdf (last visited Aug. 24,
2015).
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But, the current regime lacks an affirmative obligation to prevent
incarceration, which is arguably imposed by the constitutional duty
to respect human dignity. It includes providing services necessary
to avoid repeated state coercion that is both degrading to the individual and costly to the system.217
a. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Progressivity
Most research on therapeutic jurisprudence and procedural justice focuses on the procedures themselves and on the mental health
consumer’s satisfaction. There is little investigation of the pattern of
incarceration or what becomes of the mentally ill individual once
incarcerated. However, this emphasis on procedure and narrative autonomy is ultimately empty if the outcomes lead only to repeated
short incarcerations in hospitals or to prolonged incarceration in a
jail or prison. No matter how empathetically civil commitment procedures are performed, they will be labeled a sham if they produce
only coercion without beneficial results. Winick emphasized the urgency to redress the lack of delivery on the state’s promise for meaningful care in the community:
A therapeutic jurisprudence model of commitment,
therefore, would keep the unfulfilled promise of deinstitutionalization and provide considerably more
clinical, social, and housing resources in the community for those suffering from mental illness. It would
emphasize therapeutic needs and preventive approaches. It would respect patient dignity and autonomy when offering help. It would seek to preserve
liberty and increase therapeutic effectiveness by
minimizing legal coercion and maximizing patient
choice.218
A dignity approach to civil commitment reform would provide
an affirmative state obligation to follow incarceration with an individualized treatment plan developed in collaboration with the person
subject to civil commitment measures.
217
The high cost of this cycling pattern is unnecessary to the affirmative obligation, but it makes it far more politically feasible to implement.
218
WINICK, supra note 9, at 328.
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b. International Human Rights and Progressivity
Both the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities219 (CRPD) and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation No.
Rec. 10 support progressivity.220 The UN CRPD calls for any necessary treatment to be done “in the least restrictive environment and
with the least restrictive or intrusive treatment” and to be based on
“an individually prescribed plan, discussed with the patient, reviewed regularly, revised as necessary and provided by [a] qualified
professional staff.”221
Article 17 of the Council of Europe’s recommendations combines a legal threshold for intervention. The “significant risk of serious harm to his or her health” standard is considerably more facilitative of intervention than that established by most American state
laws reformed in the 1970s.222 The Article contains a rule requiring
less restrictive forms of care to be applied where possible (e.g., outpatient treatment) and a rule that “the opinion of the person concerned” be “taken into consideration.”223
The entire package is designed to enhance the dignity of the person. Subsequent discussion is structured on the premise that persons
receiving involuntary care are under a unique challenge to their dignity, both from the effects of illness and the effects of intervention.
An important corollary is that a system that emphasizes honoring a
patient’s dignity will benefit the therapeutic process, improve outcomes, and be a more effective exercise of state power. Each reform
is conceived to support a more holistic approach to dignifying the
involuntary care process. This approach balances the patient’s right
to autonomy within the treatment and confinement process with
their right to effective treatment and their right to respect.224
219

CRPD, supra note 168.
Rec (2004)10, supra note 183.
221
G.A. Res. 46/119, supra note 184, at 190.
222
Rec (2004)10, supra note 183, at art. 17. Article 17 permits involuntary
placement only if all five of the following conditions are met: “(i) the person has
a mental disorder; (ii) the person’s condition represents a significant risk of serious harm to his or her health or to other persons; (iii) the placement includes a
therapeutic purpose; (iv) no less restrictive means of providing appropriate care
are available; [and] (v) the opinion of the person concerned has been taken into
consideration.”
223
Id. at arts. 17–18.
224
Id. at explanatory memorandum 16, 75, 85, 91, 93, 142, 169.
220
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C. Constitutionality of Dignity Principles
Would a dignity approach to civil commitment based on these
three core principles be constitutional? The first and third principles
are fully consistent with the key constitutional decisions on civil
commitments because they would not expand the reasons justifying
incarceration or coerced treatment. The second principle—reducing
overall incarceration for individuals—raises a more difficult question, but also appears to be consistent with existing precedents.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that “a [s]tate cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom . . . .”225 The Court
further found that, “even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury
or suicide, a person is literally ‘dangerous to himself’ if for physical
or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom . . . .”226 It is unclear if the Court meant “without more” would
permit involuntary commitment, absent a showing of dangerousness. However, the Court’s broad conception of “danger to self”
seems to allow substantial room for the development of grave disability standards that contemplate intervention before acute crisis.
One of the few instances where states have expanded hospital
incarceration capacity and civil commitment laws concerns violent
sexual predators. Under the laws of twenty states, these defendants
can be civilly committed after completing their criminal sentence.
Imprisonment can continue on the grounds that they pose an ongoing risk of sexual offenses due to an underlying disorder and cannot
fully control their impulses.227 The Supreme Court has upheld these
laws as consistent with traditional state police power to incapacitate
people with psychiatric disabilities who pose a threat to themselves
or others.228 Courts reviewing decisions to hospitalize under our
225

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (emphasis added).
Id. at 574 n.9.
227
CHRYSANTHI S. LEON, SEX FIENDS, PERVERTS, AND PEDOPHILES:
UNDERSTANDING SEX CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA 121 (2011).
228
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding civil commitment for incapacitative purposes of previously imprisoned sex offenders);
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–12 (2002) (holding that lack of control is a
necessary finding for civil commitment on incapacitative grounds); United States
v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010). But see, Karsjens v. Jesson, WL 3755870,
at * 2 (D. Minn. 2015) (holding that post-sentencing civil commitment is “a pu226
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principle of minimizing incarceration would have to undertake the
kind of contextual examination of the real risks that face the person
challenging hospitalization. We concluded above that such an examination would support the exercise of state power to protect the
personal integrity and human dignity of that challenger.229
CONCLUSION: REALIGNING CIVIL COMMITMENT
There is a growing chorus of those arguing for reform of civil
commitment laws either on the ground that too many dangerous people with psychiatric disabilities are currently ignored by the state
until it is too late or that successful treatments are available.230 There
may be merit to these claims, but they echo the claims that have
preceded every cycle of incarceration for people with psychiatric
disabilities. We assert here that states should revise their civil commitment laws to place dignity at the heart of their response to persons with mental illness, thereby informing, rather than displacing,
the traditional police power and parens patriae bases for intervention. Today, we know that replacing one kind of incarceration with
another that is more punitive, more stigmatizing, and less treatmentoriented cannot protect human dignity.231
Our three principles, drawn from therapeutic justice, emerging
norms in international human rights treaties, and the distinctive,
compelling context of mass incarceration, are intended to conserve
and protect human dignity by minimizing incarceration and coercion. The first principle—narrative autonomy—reflects the insight
nitive system that segregates and indefinitely detains a class of potentially dangerous individuals without the safeguards of the criminal justice system.”) While
Minnesota has the highest number of civilly committed offenders per capita, other
states are also beginning to question this practice. Monica Davey, States Struggle
with What to Do with Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/us/states-struggle-with-what-to-do-withsex-offenders-after-prison.html?_r=0.
229
See supra Section III.B.
230
Torrey, supra note 29, at 44 (describing homicides due to untreated mental
illness), 195-96 (calling for research to determine whether treatments have improved but expressing optimism that successful means for treating those whose
mental illness threatens violence exists).
231
See WINICK, supra note 9, at 47 (explaining that “those subjected to psychiatric hospitalization against their will may suffer a serious loss of dignity”).
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that coercion is, in substantial part, a matter of procedures. When
procedures give people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words
are given respect, decisions are explained to them their views taken
into account, and they substantively feel less coercion. It may not be
possible to eliminate coercion, but a radical increase in procedural
justice for people with psychiatric disabilities can push that coercion
to the minimum level.
Our second principle—minimizing incarceration—is a direct
extension of the dignity-as-liberty emphasis of the last wave of reforms. Unlike other reform proposals that would change the legal
definition of harm or incapacity, the minimization of incarceration
gives courts guidance as to a substantive goal. It is a goal on which
legal advocacy can be more meaningfully deployed.232 At the same
time, it is a flexible and realistic standard that requires courts to consider local conditions, law enforcement and incarceration practices
and the views and understandings of the person facing incarceration
for treatment.
The third and final principle—progressivity—is intended to assure that the length of incarceration for people with psychiatric disabilities is minimized and preparedness to return to the community
is emphasized. The experience of both mass-hospitalization (in the
middle of the twentieth century) and mass-imprisonment (at the end
of the century) highlights the danger that separate and potentially
insulated state bureaucracies will have incentives to develop an institutional hold on inmates that becomes self-perpetuating.233
In this essay, we have attempted to define core principles rather
than draft new statutes. If courts were to adopt these principles as
guiding norms for the interpretation of existing statutes, the need for
significant statutory redrafting might be avoided. Moreover, some
of the more contentious battles between consumer advocates and
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Id. at 143 (noting that commitment hearings tend to be brief, non-adversarial episodes).
233
Critics today discuss the “prison-industrial complex” to describe these incentives toward incarceration. See ANGELA DAVIS, THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX (1999). The same kinds of concerns were raised about the incentives of
doctors in the large mid-twentieth century public mental hospitals. See BROWN,
supra note 19.
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proponents of more assertive treatment would be reframed.234 An
example of the latter promise is outpatient treatment laws, which
have been offered as a reform to enable earlier intervention without
hospitalization.235 Consumer and peer advocates have largely criticized such laws as opening the gate for more coercion, and they have
suggested that greater voluntary services should be provided without the lever of coercion.236
The combination of minimizing incarceration and providing
non-intrusive sustainable treatment in the least restrictive environment would allow court-ordered outpatient treatment in areas where
poor social service delivery and aggressive criminalization of people with psychiatric disabilities is occurring. This would also avoid
adding unnecessary coercion in those jurisdictions where adequate
community-based services and insightful law enforcement approaches prevail.

234
For a summary of the support and opposition players and their positions on
California’s optional outpatient treatment law, AB 1421, see Amy Yannello, Support Laura’s Law for better mental illness care, SFGATE (May 13, 2014),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Support-Laura-s-Law-for-better-mental-illness-care-5464392.php.
235
See TORREY, supra note 29, at 178 (advocating assisted outpatient laws as
a way to improve treatment).
236
The California Association of Mental Health Peer-Run Organizations, for
example, has opposed expansion and funding of AB 1421 (“Laura’s Law”) on the
bases that the perceived need for involuntary treatment is based on stigma and
that coerced treatment undermines the relationship between therapist and client
and is ineffective. The alternative, according to CAMHPRO, is adequately
funded, enhanced, voluntary community services. California Association of Mental Health Peer-Run Organizations, CAMHPRO Policy Statement on Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment; Anne Menasche & Delphine Brody, AB 1421: Involuntary Commitment: A Coalition’s Call for Self-Determination, Choice and Dignity
in
Mental
Health,
http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/OPR/PRAT2012/AB1421.pdf; see Forum with Michael Krasny,
SF Supervisors Set to Vote on Laura’s Law, KQED NEWS RADIO (July 8, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://www.kqed.org/a/forum/R201407080900.

